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ABSTRACT
Auctions, especially Internet auctions, are claimed to be efficient pricing
mechanisms, assuming rational behavior and recognition of individual fundamental
values. This assumption and its implication are at the heart of the thesis work. The
research includes both survey studies which utilize one of the most popular sites for
Internet auctions, and experiments developed in the laboratory. Both field studies and
laboratory experiments paid specific attention to the psychology of bidders with main
focuses on starting prices, price comparison, competition, and auction formats.
Two surveys and two field studies were conducted to collect statistics in real
auctions and subjective opinions from real auction participants. One field experiment
was performed on a real web site to test price sensitivity. A simulation bidding system
was built in the laboratory to examine auction formats and the effect of competition.
Four primary results are shown. First, game-playing attitude towards auctions
generally exists among bidders. Second, bidders hold strong winning aspects and suffer
either "winner's curse" or regret losing. Third, bidders are price sensitive when price
comparison is available and their price preferences are affected by the original starting
prices. Fourth, auction formats convey different information to bidders and influence
the way bidders behave.
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Chapter 1 Introduction
One of the most interesting aspects of the Internet, as well as one of the most
popular rapidly growing types of e-commerce, is Internet auctioning. Since the earliest
web-based auction sites Onsale (www.onsale.com) and eBay (www.ebay.com) opened
in 1995, Internet auctioning has been growing so fast that, at present count, over three
hundred auction sites are running their businesses on the World Wide Web (Snyder
1999) with new ones appearing almost every day. Internet auctioning has not only
captured the attention of the public and the media but it also provides new challenges
and opportunities in terms of generating great interests in understanding its trading
mechanisms, market efficiencies, and implications.
One should note that Internet auctioning is not a conceptually new auction
method. Long distance auctions by mail have existed for more than a hundred years.
Back in the 1870s, there were stamp dealers in the United States offering "mail-bidding"
services for individuals who wished to bid on stamps without having to travel to the
auction site in person. Bidders submitted bids through mail and the stamps were sold to
the highest bidder at the price of one increment over the second highest bid. This
practice is common in many auction houses today, not just in stamp auctions, but also in
auctions for wine, art, and other collectibles. (Lucking-Reiley, 1999a).
Even electronic auctions already have a substantial history. Before the first web
browser for personal computers was released at the end of 1993, there already were a
number of auctions taking place on text-based Internet newsgroups and email
discussion lists. Hundreds of different sellers ran auctions on newsgroups. Bidders
would submit their bids via email, and sellers would post daily updates of their high
bids. (Lucking-Reiley, 1999b).
1.1 Auctions as pricing mechanisms
Sellers often find it difficult to pick a price to offer for their goods. What would
be the best price that can attract the most buyers while at the same time maximize
sellers' profits? Usually there is one systematic way by which one can determine the
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sale prices: market research.
Market research has been adopted as a major practice for making pricing
policies. In market research, sellers usually collect price information by evaluating costs,
estimating supply and demand, and conducting surveys on consumer preferences and
needs. It is a time-consuming and expensive process since sellers have to go into the
market and get all the information by themselves. The results of market research are
therefore subject to biases due to limitations of time, cost and geographical locations -- it
is unrealistic for sellers to look at the whole market as opposed to a small part of it as a
sample for the market research. Moreover, the results from market research are usually
based on certain assumptions about the validity of the measures. For example,
participants (potential buyers) are asked how much they were willing to pay if they
would buy the good. Without any purchase obligation, answers to such questions do
not necessarily reflect the true value of the good but introduce errors into the price
estimates.
An alternative method to reach a price is auctioning. Auctioning shifts the
pricing effort from sellers to buyers by allowing the market force, mostly supply and
demand, to determine the prices. Instead of researching prices by themselves, sellers
only need to open their goods to the public and wait for buyers to come and bid.
Compared to market research, auctioning is much simpler and provides more benefits to
both sellers and buyers.
To illustrate some of these benefits, let us look at the Figure 1. Figure 1 presents
two identical demand curves for a specific good. In market research (Figure la), when
sellers pick a fixed price P to offer their goods, buyers will be willing to buy up to the
quantity Q (Figure la). In this case, we see that the total amount consumers pay is OP x
OQ = OPBQ, with a consumers' surplus of PP'B. We can also see from Figure la that, in
this case, even though some of the buyers would have been willing to pay more than P
to get the goods, they actually pay only the price P. At the same time, potential buyers
who do not want to pay more than P are lost.
In auctions (Figure 1b), there is not a fixed price, and the price (PB) is free to vary
between 0 (or a very low baseline) and P'. In other words, buyers are free to pick a price
which they are willing to pay, and goods are sold to buyers according to price priority.
For sellers, there are several additional benefits from such pricing methods. First, sellers
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now have chances to sell their goods to buyers who are willing to pay more than P at the
prices those buyers are willing to pay. Second, sellers are able to attract more buyers,
not just those who would be willing to pay more than P. Buyers also benefit from such
auctions. Buyers who are willing to pay more get priority over buyers who are willing
to pay less (this is important when the demand exceeds the supply). In addition, buyers
who don't mind waiting can get the goods once the price drops.
1.2 Internet auctioning
Auctioning is then a superior pricing method. Internet auctioning as a new type
of auctioning has even more advantages beyond traditional advantages of auctioning.
Internet technology can provide advantages in space, time, and cost to conduct
auctions. First, it breaks down the spatial restriction traditional auctions have and
allows people from all over the world to participate in auctions at remote sites through
the World Wide Web. Second, in terms of duration, Internet auctions can last for several
days and allow asynchronous bidding, which gives both sellers and bidders more
flexibility. Third, auction sites can manage to run auctions at substantially lower
operational costs by connecting their servers to the Internet so that they can charge
lower commission fees and attract more customers. Finally, because of these reasons,
anybody who has access to the Internet can become sellers and buyers. Together, these
advantages allow deep market penetration that was once reserved only for expensive
and unique goods.
However, there are greater risks associated with Internet auctioning. For
example, with the elimination of spatial restrictions, buyers are not able to inspect the
goods before bidding. It also takes much longer for the transaction of Internet auctions
to be completed while traditional auctions provide instant exchanges of payments and
goods. Moreover, as a trust-based trading system, Internet auctioning presents an
ethical challenge to both bidders and sellers.
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1.3 Economic and psychological views on auctions
Economists are interested in auctions because auctioning is considered a quick
and efficient mechanism for pricing and resource allocation. The efficient market
hypothesis of economic theory assumes a "frictionless, competitive market" in which
prices efficiently incorporate all public information and are regarded as optimal
estimates of true value of the goods at all times. However, one should be aware that the
efficient market hypothesis in turn is based on primitive notions that people behave
rationally, that they can value the items offered, that they can accurately maximize
expected utilities, and that they are able to process all available information. To the
extent that these assumptions do not hold (or do not hold perfectly) auctions may score
lower as efficient market mechanisms. The current work aims to explore some of the
psychological aspects of Internet auctions in order to provide a more complete
understanding of these mechanisms.
The most important assumption one has to make when considering auctions as
an efficient mechanism is that individuals can pick prices that reflect their true
underlying utility. The idea here is that individuals have internal values (fundamental
values) for different goods based on their own value systems. Theoretically, an
individual's value for a specific good can be interpreted as an exact value. For example,
if individual A's value for an apple is x cents, it means A would be willing to exchange
up to x cents for an apple. If the price of an apple is higher than the individual's value x,
a "not-buy" decision will be made; but if the price of an apple is lower than the
individual's value x, a "buy" decision will be made. Note that the claim here is not that
individuals can set prices in an error free way, rather that they do not have any
systematic bias in their price assessments.
There is a large body of literature that questions whether individuals have
accurate representations of their values (Ariely 2000). In the same spirit, the main
question we will ask in the current work is whether individuals have accurate internal
values for goods. To the extent that they don't, we will try to understand what are some
of the mechanisms by which individuals arrive at their price estimates and what are
some of the factors that influence them.
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One may ask whether the psychological effects will have higher or lower
influence on consumers' decision making in fixed price environments or in auction
environments. In the next section we would like to propose why we think that the
effects of psychological factors can be much higher in auction environments.
1.4 The role of error in fixed prices and in auction mechanisms
In a regular market where prices are fixed, only individuals with values above
the fixed price will make "buy" decisions (individuals A, B in Figure 2a). In auctions,
individuals pick prices by themselves and the prices they pick will be the maximal
prices they are willing to pay. Goods are first sold to the highest bidder A, second to B,
third to C, etc. (See Figure 2b). The pricing decisions depicted in Figures 2a and 2b
assume that consumers have precise values with no errors. Under this assumption, the
likelihood of consumers to make mistakes (in either buying something and paying too
much, or not buying something they should have) are the same across both pricing
mechanisms, and they don't make mistakes.
However, a much more realistic assumption is that individuals have some errors
in their judgments (Lawrence, 1986) and that these error are higher when the price is
closer to their stated values.
Such uncertainty can be thought of in terms of a signal-detection-theory decision
space (Macmillan & Creelman, 1990). Such a formulation can be seen in Figure 3, which
shows probability density functions that an individual will or will not buy a specific
good. In Figure 3a, every point on the curve corresponds to the probability density that
this good is a "bad deal" at a specific price. Similarly, in Figure 3b, every point on the
curve corresponds to the probability density that this good is a "good deal" at a specific
price. The shaded areas in Figure 3a and 3b denote the probability that this good is a
"bad deal" and "good deal" for this individual at price P respectively. Ultimately, the
decision to buy or not to buy this good at price P would be a function of these two
shaded areas (which will be influence by the horizontal distance, the variance of the
11
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curves and the specific value of P). Note that this formulation represents a probability
density function and therefore, consumers will sometimes consider price P as "good
deal" while at other times, they consider it as "bad deal".
We can also use signal detection theory to explain this phenomenon if we think
of P as a price cut-off (the fundamental value) that the individual sets up for this good.
Supposed the good is a "good deal". If the individual can purchase the good for no more
than P, we consider it a "hit"; otherwise a "miss." The hit rate is the proportion marked
[2] in Figure 3, which is equal to the probability of getting a "good deal" when the cut-
off price is set up at P. The area to the left of the criterion, marked as [1], is the
proportion of "misses", which represents the outcome of a "not-buy" when the decision
should have been to buy (because it is indeed a good deal). The area marked [3] is the
"correct-rejection" which is equal to the probability of correctly not buying a "bad deal"
when the cut-off price is set up at P. Finally, "false alarms" are marked as [4] which is
the area of wrongly making buying decisions when the deal is bad.
False alarms and misses are errors caused when people buy things they
shouldn't have bought or do not buy things they should have bought. At every point
along the price axis, decisions are subject to these two types of errors. In auctions,
individuals with different error preferences will behave differently. Consumers who
care more about "misses" (i.e. they would rather pay more to avoid missing anything),
would set higher prices, while consumers who care more about "false alarms" (i.e. they
rather miss things than overpay for anything) will choose lower prices. Consumers who
care about both types of errors and want to balance both types of errors will choose a
price that will have a high overlap between the two curves.
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The effect of these two types of errors in setting prices is that we should expect a
higher probability of consumer erroneous decisions in auctions as opposed to fixed price
markets. The idea is that errors exist in fixed price markets but that they occur only to a
small fraction of people whose distribution coincides with the fixed price (P). For
consumers whose values are high above or below P, the probability of error is very low.
For a graphical illustration of this effect see Figure 4a which is a replication of Figure 2a
with the added assumptions about errors. As can be seen from Figure 4a, for the
majority of the consumers in fixed price markets (A, B, D, and E in this case), there is no
overlap between the probability density function and P, and hence no mistakes. Because
their distribution curves either fall far below the fixed price line and "not-buy" decisions
are called for (A and B); or their distribution curves stand far beyond the fixed price line
and "buy" decisions are concluded (D and E). A and B will correctly buy the product at
price P (hit) while consumers D and E will correctly not buy the product at price P
(correct rejection). Consumer C in this case is the only one that is susceptible to make
mistakes. In auctions, on the other hand, the picture is very different and the potential
for errors is substantially increased. Assuming consumers try to balance both types of
errors, they will pick prices within their decision spaces, which will expose them to a
high degree of error. For a graphical illustration of this effect see Figure 4b which is a
replication of Figure 2b with the added assumptions about errors. As can be seen in
Figure 4b, every single consumer in this case picks a price that balances the two types of
error and therefore also causes their decision to be susceptible to errors.
15
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In this paper, particular attention is paid to the psychological factors involved in
Internet auctions. Several questions are to be answered: Is Internet auctioning an
efficient mechanism? Do psychological factors and human behavior impact bidding
patterns in Internet auctions? If yes, what are the rules that govern the psychology of
bidding? The paper presents some experimental work that has been conducted to
examine sellers' and bidders' behavior and provides some insights into whether the
auctioning mechanism actually works as a competitive market and how human
behavior is engaged in this trading system. The evidence presented came from four
different sources. First we present survey data regarding Internet auctions. Second, we
present analysis of existing data from different auctions. Third, we present a field
experiment we conducted on one of the largest Internet auction sites, and finally we
report a lab experiment in which we implemented our own auction web sites. The
paper concludes with an overall discussion of the findings, summary, and suggestions
for future research.
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Chapter 2 Survey Studies
Two surveys of Internet auction users were conducted to study the
characteristics of auctions, users, and their behaviors. Participants for both studies were
recruited from eBay and responded by filling out one of two web surveys presented on
our personal site. There are several reasons of recruiting subjects from eBay. First, eBay
is the largest international web-based person-to-person auction site in terms of number
of users, number of listed items, and item variety. Second, eBay is one of the earliest
web-based person-to-person auction sites and therefore eBay users on average have
more experiences in Internet auctioning than those of other auction sites. Moreover,
users in eBay have formed several online communities that have made it easier to
promote the surveys to anonymous users and get feedback from them. Surveys were
put on the community bulletin board of eBay inviting volunteer participation in an
academic study of online auctions.
2.1 Survey 1
The first survey was a descriptive survey of Internet auction users. The goal of
this survey was to find out whom the auction users are, how often they visit auction
sites for buying and selling, their trading interests, their concerns for Internet auctioning,
and their expectations to the future of Internet auctioning.
This study collected feedback from 197 subjects, 67% of who were female and
88% speak English as their first language. The age of the participants ranges from 18
(the minimal legal age to register for online auctions) to 69, with a mean of 39. Their
level of education ranges from 1 year to 26 years with a mean of 14 years. A large
majority of the participants (85%) indicated that they visit eBay most frequently,
followed by Amazon (6%).
Table 1 shows the frequencies of auction sites visiting and usage. First, it is
interesting to note that almost 92% of the participants indicated that they visit auction
sites at least 3 times a week. The frequencies of buying and selling on these auction sites
are obviously lower then the frequency of visiting these sites but they are also
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substantial. 50% of the participants indicated that they sell things at auction sites once a
week or more, and 30% of the participants indicated that they buy things at auction sites
once a week or more. These numbers demonstrated that Internet auctions have become
an important source for retailing and shopping.
Table 1: Usage frequency of action sites for different purposes
Questions At least 3 About once About once About once a Less than Total number
times a a week every 2 month once a of responses
week weeks month
How often do you visit 91.9% 5.6% 0.0% 0.5% 2.0% 197
auction sites?
How often do you sell at 35.6% 14.4% 10.8% 11.3% 27.8% 194
auction sites?
How often do you buy at 11.7% 18.3% 25.9% 22.3% 21.8% 197
auction sites?
Participants were also asked to rate their level of interests in different auction
categories (based on eBay's categories) on a scale from 0 "not interested at all" to 10
"extremely interested in". As Table 2 shows, Collectibles seems to be the most attractive
categories to auction fans, while those big tickets such as automobiles are the least
popular. Analyzing the interest level in a regression analysis revealed a gender
difference on some categories and concerns. The data show that males are more
interested in automobiles, electronics, coins and stamps, and sport memorabilia while
females favor more in collectibles, dolls, jewelry and pottery. In addition, the results
also showed that participants with higher education were less interested in toys.
Table 2: Average preference for different product categories on eBay.
Category Mean (level of interests) Standard Error
Collectibles 7.221 .236
Books, Movies, Music 5.704 .241
Antiques 4.831 .279
Computers 3.852 .247
Pottery & Glass 3.785 .276
Dolls and Figures 3.392 .262
Toys 3.082 .264
Electronics 3.082 .228
Jewelry & Gemstones 2.958 .239
Coins & Stamps 2.318 .220
Sport Memorabilia 2.166 .217
Automobiles 1.150 .167
*The data is sorted from most attractive to least attractive.
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Participants were also asked to rate their levels of concerns for different factors
that would impact their usage of online auction sites and decisions on whether or not to
bid. Ratings were ranged from 0 the "not concerned with" to 10 "very concerned with".
Data in Table 3 show that auction site server reliability, product quality, and bidder/seller
reputation were of highest concern. Reserve price, starting price, auction duration, and
number of other bidders were among the least concerns (we will later test some of their
self-reports against behavioral data later). In addition to the ratings of the different
factors, we also ran a regression model between the different concerns and genders. The
results also showed that females are more concerned with starting price (t = 2.48, p =
0.014), reputation (t = 2.03, p = 0.044), and marginally more concerned with product
quality (t = 1.77, p = 0.078), and with its description (t = 1.87, p = 0.063.)
Table 3: Level of concerns for using Internet auctioning in descending order
Concerns Mean (Level of concerns) Standard Error
Server Reliability 9.163 .114
Product Quality 9.151 .070
e Reputation 9.149 .117
Description/Photo 9.097 .115
After auction Service 8.888 .130
Procedure and Expense 8.760 .147
Privacy Policy 8.597 .173
Auction Rules 8.563 .161
Searching Options 8.543 .170
Web Security 8.533 .184
Shipping and Handling 7.851 .186
" Reserve Price 6.959 .218
e Starting Price 6.802 .212
Payment methods 6.434 .250
Auction Duration 5.908 .236
e Number of other bidders 4.617 .258
- Responses are on 10-point scale with 0 the least concerned to 10 the most concerned).
- Items marked with a (e) will be tested later.
Subjects were also asked to describe in text their pleasant and unpleasant
experiences and make comments regarding Internet auctioning. In general, many
Internet auction users are positive with auctioning online as a way to sell and buy. The
pleasant experiences are often described as selling or buying things at decent prices or
finding things that are hard to be found elsewhere. Many subjects also mentioned that
they enjoyed the friendly relationship built up with other auction users through smooth
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transactions and they considered appreciation from other auction users very important
to them. One of the subjects wrote:
"Actually collecting the money would have to be (the) best thing but it's also very
satisfying helping someone else locate that one special collectible!"
For the unpleasant experiences, most comments were related to transaction
problems such as delay or denial of payment or shipment, overcharges of shipping fees,
damaged shipment, etc. Subjects also expressed strong concerns of honesty in auctions.
Another frequently mentioned issue was the stability and reliability of the auction sites.
Because online auctions are time sensitive and all bids are submitted through remote
access to the servers, the reliability and the stability of the servers become crucial to the
performance of auction sites. Some subjects mentioned bids not going through at a time
close to the end of the auction due to heavy traffic and delays in the system.
2.2 Survey 2
In this second survey, subjects were asked to provide answers for eight questions
in an online survey form. These questions are specifically related to individuals' in-
auction and after-auction feelings. Subjects were asked to rate their feelings in a scale
from 0 "the least" to 10 "the strongest". 199 subjects responded to the survey and the
results are shown in Table 4. In addition to the responses of the participants, Table 4
also includes a column that gives the expected result that would have been given if
participants are treating auctions by examining whether they want the good, comparing
prices and using this information to set their bidding prices. We name this column
Rational Expectations. Note that these are rational expectation only to the extent that
people use such auction channels as purchasing instances without deriving any utility
from the experience itself.
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Table 4: Responses to on-line behavior in auctions.
Questions Mean Std. Error Rational t-Value p-Value
Expectation
1 How often do you feel that bidding on a 5.025 .258 0 19.462 <.0001
good is like playing a game?
2 How important is it to you to win an 5.337 .188 0 28.429 <.0001
auction?
3 How often is it that you won a good but 2.548 .162 -
once it arrived you were less enthusiastic
about it?
4 How often do you think you paid too 2.157 .137 0 15.983 <.0001
much for a good you won at auctions?
5 How often did you make a bid and once 1.646 .141 0 11.679 <.0001
you won, you regretted the fact that you
were the winner?
6 How often are you disappointed when 4.843 .212 0 22.825 <.0001
you lose the auction?
7 How often do you compare prices on other 4.726 .269 10 -19.602 <.0001
Internet non-auction stores before you bid
on the auction?
8 How often do you buy things, which are 1.077 .137 0 7.873 <.0001
more expensive at auction sites than they
are at other Internet stores?
*Responses are on 10-point scale with 0 the least of the feeling to 10 the strongest of the feeling. When there
is a rational answer it is indicated in the rational expectation column and the results are compared to it in a t
test.
As can be seen from Table 4, people often feel bidding is like a game, they want
to win this game (Question 1, Question 2), and they admit that sometimes they get
carried away and over bid or regret it later (Question 3, Question 4, Question 5). It is
also interesting to see that people have a much higher regret for not setting their prices
sufficiently high (Question 6) and loosing an auction compared with winning at a price
that is set too high (Question 4, Question 5). This last comparison of regret and
disappointment correspond to "false alarms" and "misses" respectively. Regret usually
occurs when people realize later that they bought the good at a price that is too high,
while misses are often due to under-bidding (see Figure 3). Since there is always a
chance of at least one type of errors within the decision space, it is reasonable to assume
that the rational behavior of an individual who has no bias (preference) on either type of
errors would be to balance between these two types of errors. That is, to pick a price
where the false alarm rate is equal to the miss rate. However, we see that in Table 4, the
mean for questions 4 and 5, which represents the rate of false alarms, is about less than
half of the reported misses (Question 6). This comparison indicates that people think
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that in many cases their bids are too low and that they commit too many misses
compared with false alarms.
Our participants also indicated that they compare prices only about half of the
times but that they rarely buy things which are more expensive at auction sites
compared with other internet stores. We will test some of these self reports in the later
sections.
2.3 Discussion
Survey 1 and 2 have shown the overall information about Internet auction
players and their auction perspectives. We see that participants in our survey are very
involved with Internet auction sites, visit them often and participate in many
transactions. Survey 2 showed that the behavior of auction users, does not always
follow what is predicted by a simple minded economic theory, and seem to involve
other factors such as treating the experience as a game with a win/lose outcome, and
also differentially treating winning auctions and loosing auctions. These aspects which
relate to the psychology of Internet auctions will be tested in the next sections by using
field data, a field experiment, and a lab experiment.
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Chavter 3 Field Studies
We conducted two field studies by tracking auctions in a large auction site and
trying to relate the final bids to different characteristics of the auction itself. Field Study
1 tracked auctions for the Rose Bowl game and Field Study 2 tracked prices for
commodities such as books, CDs, DVDs etc.
3.1 Field Study 1
Field Study 1 started one month before the day of 2000 Rose Bowl Game, which
was on January 1, 2000. During this month (December 1999), more than two hundred
auctions selling Rose Bowl Game tickets were put on eBay and tracked.
We kept tracking of all auctions selling Rose Bowl Game tickets and recorded
details of each auction. From December 2nd 1999 to December 31st 1999, there were 275
valid' auctions selling Rose Bowl Game tickets on eBay. We have taken out some
auctions that sold not only tickets but also other services such as parking, flight,
accommodation, etc. For each auction we recorded starting price per ticket, final price per
ticket, total number of bids, total number of bidders, date started, auction duration, seller
reputation, and the number of tickets offered at each auction.
Among the 275 auctions monitored, average starting price per ticket is $117.64
while average final price per ticket is $148.17, presenting an average increase of 26%.
We ran a regression model with final price per ticket as the dependent measure and
starting price per ticket, total number of bids, total number of bidders, date started, auction
duration, seller reputation, number of tickets available per auction as independent measures.
The full model was highly significant [R=. 919, F (8,264) = 179.146, p < .0001].
Examination of the coefficients in Table 5 show that final price was positively
related to starting price, total number of bids, and total number of bidders. The latter two
effects are easily reconciled with our understanding of auctions. If there are more
bidders or more bids, the price by definition has to increase. However, the large effect of
starting price is not easily apparent. Why would bidders pay more when the starting
'Valid auctions only included auctions that were not cancelled before the official ending time.
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price is higher? One could suggest that the starting price acted as a reference price but
this would have to be a specific reference price to that particular ticket since there were
many tickets for sale at that time and participants could easily obtain a general reference
price for the category. The results also showed that final price was negatively related to
the date the auction started and its duration. This starting date result could be interpreted
by segmentation of bidders by their priority in purchasing. It is highly likely that
bidders who were more interested in going to the Rose Bowl were bidding earlier to be
sure that they can go to this game and that they were also willing to pay higher prices
for this experience. The auction duration time is not as easily explained since the
shorted auctions ended up with higher prices. A prior one would expect that longer
auctions would allow more people to place more bids. The fact that shorted auctions
seems to bring higher prices could suggest that such shorter auctions increase
competition among bidders. Finally, it is interesting to note that despite the high
concern participants in Survey 1 showed for sellers' reputation, this factor did not seem to
have any influence on the final price. In fact it was the factor with the lowest effect from
all the factors we examined in this study.
Table 5: Regression results for Rose Bowl Game Ticket Sale.
Std. Coeff. t-value p-value
Starting price .809 28.265 <.0001
Total number of bids .404 7.106 <.0001
Date Started -.273 -6.844 <.0001
Auction duration -.128 -3.772 .0002
Total number of bidders .176 2.844 .0048
Number of Tickets -.015 -.587 .5577
Seller reputation -.008 -.307 .7590
3.2 Field Study 2
Field Study 2 was designed to examine the issue of price comparison and
efficiency of auctions as selling mechanisms. Recall that participants in Survey 2
indicated that they price compare about half of the time and that they rarely buy things
in auctions which would have been more expensive elsewhere (see Table 4). In Field
Study 2, we tracked auctions on a large Internet auction site for music CDs, books, and
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movies (VHS and DVDs). For each of the items that was offered at the auction, we
spend between 2 and 20 minutes searching (mean search time 7.23 min) for the same
item at other sites and receded the prices in other sites for the same item. In all cases, we
searched common popular sites and the search time we recorded was the time it took us
to find the price of the item in all sites.
The results showed that the prices on the auction site were lower than the best
site we found in only 1.2% of the times (for more results see Table 6). This difference
caused consumers to pay an average 15.3% more for goods on the auction site compared
with other Internet retailers. Combining this increased price together with the facts that
transactions on the auction site take longer (the buyer usually has to send a check or
money order, which has to be cleared and only than the order is shipped), that the
reputation of individuals most likely is lower than that of commercial sites, and that it is
harder to return merchandise to individuals compared with commercial sites, suggest
that electronic auctions might be less than efficient.
Table 6: Results for Price Comparison
% of times when prices were lower in Auction
Lowest site 1.2%
2"d Lowest site 21.1%
3 Lowest site 55.3%
4* Lowest site 69.5%
5* Lowest site 72.4%
3.3 Discussion
Field Studies 1 and 2 indicated a few interesting deviations from rational
expectations about auction behavior and from the self-reports of participants in our
surveys. First, despite of the self-reported concern with reputation of sellers, bidders for
the Rose Bowl tickets did not seem to be influences by the reputation. This is despite the
fact that these are unique items that cannot be accurately described (what is a good
seat?) and despite the fact that there is no way to return them after discovering that the
tickets are not good or not as good as promised. Moreover, the second field study
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indicated that prices bidders pay for commodities are not as low as they indicated in
Survey 2 and in fact are almost always higher than prices of regular Internet retailers.
How to explain this discrepancy and the drivers of people's behavior in electronic
auction will be addressed in the next field experiment and lab experiment.
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Chapter 4 Field Experiment
4.1 Method
This field experiment was conducted on a real public-accessible Internet auction
site. Each week we placed four items on auction for a week. These goods were
purchased in advance from other retail stores and put on auctions for resale. The goods
we auctioned off were movie DVDs and tapes, web cameras, computer keyboards, and
trackballs. We had three different starting price conditions. In the low starting price
condition, items started at a low price ($1). In the high starting price condition, items
stared at a high price (either $5 or $30 depending on the item). In the "High & Low"
starting price condition, 2 items were offered, one starting at the low price ($1) and one
at the high price (either $5 or $30 depending on the item). In all cases we used four
fictional sellers to sell each of the four items that were offered each week (for more info
see Table 7)
Table 7: Starting Price Experiment Schedule.
Movie DVD Web Camera Computer Keyboard
Week A H H L L
($5) ($30) ($1) ($1)
Week B L H L H
($1) ($30) ($1) ($30)
Week C H L L H
($5) ($1) ($1) ($30)
Movie Videotape Web Camera Computer Trackball
Week D H H L L
($5) ($30) ($1) ($1)
Week E L H L H
($1) ($30) ($1) ($30)
Week F H L L H
($5) ($1) ($1) ($30)
* H is indicating a high price and L a low price
As can be seen in Table 7, in week A one seller was selling a movie DVD at a
high starting price, another seller was selling a computer keyboard at a low starting
price, and two other sellers were selling web cameras one with a high and one with a
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low staring price. Other weeks were similar in the auction formats but counterbalanced
the products at each of the starting price conditions.
To eliminate possible disturbance, all sellers were newly registered fictitious
sellers at that time and had zero rating of reputation. All auctions started on the same
day at the same time of each week and all lasted for exactly seven days. The
advertisement and description for the same type of goods over different weeks were
exactly the same and only differed in starting prices and sellers' IDs. Rules and
conditions remained unchanged across all auctions.
4.2 Results
The purpose of this experiment was to see whether identical goods with different
starting prices will be treated differently by bidders and also to see whether bidders
compare between identical goods with different starting prices.
In order to examine the results we first ran an overall ANOVA test on the 2
(starting price) by 2 (availability of comparison) on the entire sets of bids that were
submitted. The results showed a main effect for starting price [F (1, 168) = 8.79, p =
0.0035] and a significant interaction between starting price and availability of
comparison [F (1, 168) = 4.45, p = 0.036]. As can be seen in Figure 5a, higher starting
prices caused participants to pay higher prices for the goods but only when there were
no immediate comparisons. When participants could compare the prices of two items,
there was no effect for the starting price. An analysis of the overall profits/losses we
had during this experiment revealed two interesting aspects (see Figure 5b). First, while
we lost an average of $7 for each item sold when comparison was made easy, we did not
loose any money in the conditions where subjects were not able to do a direct
comparison. Second, it is interesting to note that we made a profit for items we sold in
the separate high price condition. Finally, it is also interesting to note that low starting
prices attracted more bids [F (1,20) = 9.775, p < .01] and more bidders [F (1,20) = 9.538, p
< .01].
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4.3 Discussion
When starting this experiment we had two opposing hypotheses about the effect
of starting price. On one hand, we expected that if prices started low, participants
*ould be drawn to the auction (and we see from the results that indeed lower starting
prices drew more bidders and more bids) and if their bidding pattern would escalate,
they would end up paying higher prices in the low starting price condition. On the
other hand, given the results of the Rose Bowl study, we expected that higher starting
prices would cause higher ending prices. We also expected that the availability of direct
comparison (when two items are sold simultaneously at two different starting prices)
would reduce the effect of starting price.
The results we got show that high starting prices cause higher ending prices but
only when there is no direct comparison. Does this means that the opposite effect where
people could be drawn to auctions and stay in the auction for too long does not exist? It
is too early to make a judgment about this issue since we had only a few bidders in each
of our auctions (average 6.75) and the items were relatively boring commodities.
Up till now, we have showed that the prices bidders set in auctions are
influenced by the starting prices of the auctions. Specifically, we showed that, for the
same item, higher starting prices can drive the final bids up and sellers can get higher
profits by setting the starting prices higher. These were true in both Rose Bowl ticket
sale and the field experiment we conducted on an auction site.
Next, we want to test the effect of competition and auction formats as factors
influencing the bidders' bidding behavior.
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Chapter 5 Laboratory Experiment
Rational models of behavior would suggest if individual valuations are
independent, the bidding behavior should not differ across major auction formats - that
is, when individuals know their fundamental values of a given good, the way they place
bids is not affected by auction formats (Vickrey, 1961). However, when the assumption
of individual fundamental values does not hold perfectly in reality, which has been
suggested by our previous studies and a large body of documents (Feldman and
Reinhart, 1995a), auction format will affect the way bidders bid on auctions and hence
their individual valuations. An experiment was conducted to study whether this is true
in Internet auctions.
Before going further to the details of the experiment, let us first give some
introduction and discussion of auction formats.
5.1 Concepts in auction formats
5.1.1 Second-price auctions vs. First-price auctions
Auction formats can be categorized by the way how the final prices are set.
There are usually two categories, the first-price auctions and the second-price auctions.
In a first-price auction, which has been considered the "standard" format in
auction literatures, the highest bidder will pay exactly what he/she has bid for the good.
For example, if a total of three bids are received in $10, $20, and $30 respectively, the
highest bidder is the one who bid for $30 and he/she has to pay exactly $30 in exchange
for the good.
However, in a second-price auction, which is also called a "Vickrey auction", the
highest bidder wins the good in return for payment of the second-highest bid amount
plus one increment (the size of the increment can be 0). For example, supposed in an
auction, one increment is $5.00 and a total of 3 bids are received in $10, $20, and $30
respectively. The good will go to the winner whose bid is $30 but the he/she only needs
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to pay the second-highest bid amount ($20) plus one increment of $5, which is $25 in
total, for the good.
From the aspect of individual fundament values, second-price auction format is
mathematically proved to be a more precise auction format in that its outcome is more
close to the true individual value than that of a first-price auction (Vickrey, 1961).
Assuming rational behavior, bidders will always pay less than (or in some cases equal
to) their maximal willingness, the outcome of the auction should converge to the true
value of the good.
Although mathematically better and being prominent in the stamp business,
second-price auctions had been rare in the economy overall. Rothkopf et al. (1990)
propose two explanations for the scarcity of Vickrey auctions: (1) bidders may fear
truthful revelation of information to third parties with whom they will interact after the
auction, and (2) bidders may fear auctioneer cheating. In the course of his research,
Lucking-Reiley (1999b) discovered several pieces of direct evidence that the second
reason was indeed a real factor: bidders do fear auctioneer cheating in second-price
auctions. Once bidders have submitted their maximum willingness to pay, the
auctioneer has an incentive to cheat, and pretend that he/she received another bid just
under the highest maximum amount.
Despite of the reasons listed above, second-price-like features have been
appearing in the rapid growing sector of auction business, online auctions. Led by the
largest Internet-based auction sites, eBay and Amazon, more and more online auction
sites are adopting second-price formats as standards. First-price auctions are used by
many retail auction sites (such as FirstAuction.com, uBid.com, egghead.com, etc) which
allow "buy" activities only.
5.1.2 Sealed-bid auctions vs. English auctions
Auction formats can also be classified by the auctioning process. Some of the
major formats are Sealed-bid auction, English auction, and Dutch auction. In this thesis,
we only look at Sealed-bid auction and English Auction.
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Sealed-bid Auctions
Sealed-bid auction is a simple auction mechanism in which each participating
bidder can submit only one bid before the official ending time. This type of auction is
call "sealed-bid" in the sense that no bids will be revealed until the auction is ended
officially. US stamp dealers back in the 1870s used to offer "mail-bidding" services for
individuals who wished to bid on stamps without having to travel to the auction site in
person. Bidders submitted bids sealed in envelopes through mail and the results were
announced in newspaper. There are, but very few, Sealed-bid auctions on the Internet.
English Auctions
English auction is by far the most prevalent format on the Internet. The world's
largest auction sites, eBay and Amazon, are using English auction formats. English
auction is also called ascending-price auction in that the auctioneer begins with the
lowest acceptable price - the reserve price - and proceeds to solicit successively higher
bids from the bidders until no one will increase the bid. The good is sold to the highest
bidder.
In English auctions, bidders are able to see their competitors and the bids from
the competitors during bidding. Though at anytime the maximum price of the highest
bidder will not be revealed, other bidders are able to get feedback by looking at the
current winning bid to find out how much the good is at least worth and how much
buying power other bidders might have. As bids go up, bidders can get more
information on the prevailing value of the good and can adjust their bids constantly.
The way sealed-bid works does not allow feedback among different bidders
before the auction is over. Assuming there is no collusion, bidders are given only one
opportunity to pick a price that they are willing to pay without knowing how much the
second highest bid would possibly be. Hence it is more likely that bidders in sealed-bid
auction will submit the maximal prices they are willing to pay, which is equal or very
close to their fundamental values. Since there is no learning from other bidders during
bidding and no competition among bidders, it is reasonable to expect that the prices
bidders offer in a sealed-bid auction reflect the good's value for each bidder and the
winning bid would be relatively higher than that of an English auction.
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5.1.3 Laboratory auction formats
Both Sealed-bid auctions and English auctions were examined in our laboratory
experiment. For all formats in the laboratory, we applied the second-price rule that the
highest bidder paid on the second-highest price plus one increment. While Sealed-bid
format is simple in nature and can be easily modeled, English auction format is a little
bit complicate. The English formats we examined were developed based on those
applied in eBay and Amazon. There is slight difference between the English auction
formats applied in these two sites.
In an Amazon auction, the ending time depends on the bidding behavior. An
auction will end at a pre-set official time only if nobody bids within the last 10 minutes;
otherwise the auction will be automatically extended for another 10 minutes from the
time the last bid is entered. The Amazon auction format is more similar to traditional
in-house English auctions in which bidders are presented in the same room and the
auctioneer closes the auction using the traditional "going... going... gone!" procedure.
On eBay, an auction will end exactly at a pre-set official time without any
extension and the highest bidder will get the good. For this reason, it would not be
surprising to see that if bidders all rush to place their bids at the last minute, some bids
might not be accepted by the server before the auction ends, due to the congestion of the
network. However, this will not be the case in the earlier stage of an eBay auction
because bids will be able to go through the network anyway as long as time allows. So if
the bidding frequency during an eBay auction is a constant, the probability of a bid
being accepted is diminishing as it gets closer to the end of the auction.
In order to understand this probabilistic phenomenon, it is reasonable to think of
eBay auction format as one of the two slightly different formats under different
circumstances. When the network traffic is far below its capacity (small number of
bidders), the eBay auction format is an eBay auction format in that bids submitted
anytime before the official ending time will be accepted by the server as valid bids.
While in the circumstance when the network capacity is limited, the auction is an eBay
p<1.0 auction format in which bids submitted in the last period of an auction is subject
to an acceptance rate less than 1. In the experiment, this probability was fixed at p=0.5.
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5.2 Laboratory experiment
Sealed-bid auction and English auction are two very different auction formats
not only in the way auctions are conducted but also in the presence of competition.
Though both allow multiple participants, competition among fellow bidders is implicit
in Sealed-bid auctions but explicit in English auctions. While English auction format
seems to be more complicate than Sealed-bid format, the three variations of English
formats we mentioned before are in fact only different in the "final period" operation,
i.e., the way an auction ends.
In Sealed-bid auctions, bidders can only bid once, so there are no special bidding
strategies in general except bidders have to acquire enough information about the good
to find out the value before they go for an auction. But there are some common bidding
strategies often used by bidders in English auction. For example, bidders might shade
their true valuation for the goods at the beginning and start with entering low bids to
see how others react, then they gradually increase the bids.
The goal of this experiment is to expand our previous field studies and field
experiments into the laboratory where we can, by examining all 4 auction formats
(Sealed-bid, Amazon, eBay, and eBay p<1), obtain some evidence in the effects of
1. Competition, by comparing Sealed-bid auction format vs. English auction
formats; and
2. "Final period", by comparing the 3 formats (Amazon, eBay, eBay p<1) within
English auction format.
5.2.1 Method
Subjects: 52 students from Massachusetts Institute of Technology participated in
the experiment. Subjects were recruited by advertisements around campus. About half
of the subjects were undergraduate students and the other half were graduate students
or, in a few cases, staffs at the Institute. Subjects were randomly divided into groups of
4 people each and different experimental conditions were assigned to different groups.
There was only one group (4 subjects) participating in the experiment at a time. Each
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group spent from 20 minutes to 60 minutes, depending on the experimental conditions
and the subjects' performance (more on this later).
Experimental Conditions: There are four types of conditions corresponding to
the four auction formats we have discussed before. However, all formats but the sealed-
bid have been slightly modified to fit in the experimental environment and purposes.
For all auction formats in the laboratory, time is discrete instead of continuous.
Each auction was sliced into multiple rounds of bidding. In each round, members of a
given group needed to make bidding decision on an item. There are two types of
decisions that bidders can make: they can either raise their bids or keep the bids they
entered in the previous round (for the first round, all subjects have to raise their bids).
Only when all members in the group have made decisions can the auction move to a
next bidding round. The experimental conditions for each of the four formats are listed
below:
* Amazon In this format, an auction will end only if there are two consecutive
bidding rounds that nobody raises bids. This is a simulation of the actual Amazon
"last-10-minute" rule. All bids (keep or raise) are consider valid bids by the system.
" eBay p<1 (p=0.5) In this format, we fixed the probability of bid acceptance to 0.5.
An auction will move to a final bidding round immediately after there are two
consecutive rounds that nobody raises bids. In the final round, subjects can either
raise or keep bids but it will be their last chance to make decision on that given
auction. The auction is over after the final bidding round. All bids (raise or keep)
submitted in any round but the final round will be considered as valid bids while
bids submitted in the final round are subject to a probability of 0.5 of being
considered as valid bids.
" eBay In this format, an auction will move to a final bidding round
immediately after there are two consecutive rounds that nobody raises bids. In the
final round, subjects can either raise or keep bids but it will be their last chance to
make decision on that given auction. The auction is over after the final bidding
round. All bids (raise or keep) submitted in any round will be accepted as valid
bids. That is, the probability of any single bid being a valid bid is 1.
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* Sealed-bid In a sealed-bid auction, all subjects in a given group must submit
one and only one bid. All bids are valid.
Design: The main experimental manipulation was the auction format, which was
manipulated between groups in 4 formats: Sealed-bid, Amazon, eBay, eBay p<1. Subjects
within the same group shared the same format. All subjects were given both a written
and an oral instruction on general bidding. Each subject was provided with a printed
catalog with 18 color pictures of 18 different goods each plus brief description (See
Appendix 1). Most items were MIT memorabilia and the retail prices range from $5.00 to
$30. In addition to the general bidding rules, subjects were informed of the following
information before started:
* All 18 items are auctioned for real which means there will be exchange of money and
goods at the end of the experiment
* For every given group, even though all 18 items will be auctioned, only 1 out of 18 is
available for sale. The available item will be announced only after the experiment is
over. This policy is applied to reduce some possible noises in the experiment such as
preference bidding (i.e. subjects only bid on things they are interested in) and the
worry of one's pocket. All subjects are asked to evaluate each item as if it is the only
item that they will be able to get.
* At the end of experiment, the highest bidder of the available item will need to pay
for the good he or she wins.
* Subjects are not allowed to talk to each other except the experimenter to avoid any
possible collusion.
* Auction rules of the particular auction format that a given group has been assigned
to.
After reviewing an item on the catalog, subjects estimated the valuation of the
item and entered an initial number for their values. Starting from the second bidding
round (Sealed-bid excluded), subjects could raise their bids by entering a bigger number
which had to be greater than the current highest bid, or they could simply press the
"keep bid" button to stay with the original bids they submitted. When they finished
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bidding on one item, subjects moved the next item listed on catalog and starting bidding
again. Catalogs were prepared in different versions with different listing order of 18
items to counterbalance. Different groups might be presented all items in same listing
order, but groups engaged in the same auction format were presented with different
listing order. For example, a group bidding on Amazon format might be using the same
catalog as another group bidding on Sealed-bid format; but any two groups bidding on
Sealed-bid format were presented with different listing order catalog. The experiment
was run over all 4 types of formats before it started a new cycle.
Procedures: Before the experiment started, bidding instructions were explained.
Subjects were told that they would face real decisions for real money in which they
would be asked to indicate the amount they would like to pay for each of the 18
different items listed in the catalog.
Each subject was assigned to a computer from which they can access the Internet.
The bidding system was built on one of the server at MIT. Subjects then logged in to the
bidding system using a pre-assigned user name. The first web page they saw was the
auction for the first item listed in the catalog. The bidding interface was vertically
divided into two parts (See Figure 6). The left part showed the public information that
all subjects in the group were able to access at the same time. It contained the name of
the item currently offered, type of auction format used, the numbering of the current
bidding round, highest bidder's user name, current winning bid, and the total number
of bidders participated. At the lower part of the public information board, a bidding
history of last round's results was presented with the winning bidder's name on the top
and the lowest bidder's username in the bottom. The right part of the screen showed
the private information that only the user who logged in the machine could access. It
included the username and the number that user entered last time. On the lower part of
the private information board was the box that allowed bidder to enter a higher bid. If a
bidder wanted to raise his/her bid, he/she had to press the "raise bid" button after
entering a higher bid; or if the bidder wanted to stay with the current bid, he/she could
just do it by pressing the "keep bid" button without entering a number. For the first
round, subjects could only raise their bids, no matter how much they wanted to raise to.
Starting from the second round, subjects could choose from "raise bid" or "keep bid".
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However, in any round except the first one, subjects had to enter a number that is
greater than the bigger one of the current highest bid and his/her last bid. That is,
subjects could not lower their bids. The system automatically moved to a new round
when all subjects have finished the current round. During the bidding, subjects were
able to look up the public information board on the left part of the screen for the current
highest bid. Since all auction formats tested were second-price based, the current
highest bid shown on screen was already second-priced, which equals the winning bid.
The winning bid was defined as the amount that the highest bidder would actually need
to pay. It equals to the second-highest bid plus $1 if the highest bid is more than $1
above the second highest bid or, exactly the highest bid if the difference between the
second highest bid and the highest bid is less than $1. Subjects were never able to see
the highest bids from the public information board.
After the final round of an auction, subjects can click on the screen and view the
results including all final bids of all subjects. Then, they will move to the auction of the
next item in the catalog. As mentioned previously, all auctions bid by the same group
were in the same auction format. The amount of time spent on each group really
depended on the format used and the individual performance. It is obvious that sealed-
bid auctions took much less time than the other three formats. While for the other three
types of English auction formats, experiments lasted from 30 minutes to 60 minutes.
After each auction started, the progress of the whole experiment was under control of
the subjects, and an auction could go forever if subjects keep raising their bids.
40
A Se|rReputation Rat n
Histor y
5.2.2 Results and Discussion
We ran 13 groups (52 subjects) in total, which included 3 groups of Sealed-bid,
eBay, eBay p<1 each and 4 groups of Amazon auctions. For each group in the experiment,
we recorded not only bids of every bidding round of every bidder's, auction format but
also the, max bid2 and final bid3 of each bidder, winning bid'of each auction, "Max bid -first
bid" and "final bid - second final bid" of each bidder.
In order to exam the effects of competition and "final period", we calculated the
descriptive statistics and ran regression models for each of the measures (winning bid,
max bid, final bid, max bid -first bid, final bid - second final bid) as dependant variables of
auctionformat.
Max Bid
"Max bid" is defined as the largest bid amount ever submitted by a bidder in an
auction, valid or invalid. It is the maximal amount of money that a bidder is willing to
pay in exchange of the goods. Overall descriptive statistics show that Sealed-bid and eBay
formats received higher max bids than the other two formats, Amazon and eBay p<1.
However, if we looked at the three English auctionformats (Amazon, eBay, eBay p<1) as a
whole versus Sealed-bid, we see that Sealed-bid receives higher max bid than the average
of the other three formats.
We ran an overall ANOVA test on the 4 auction formats on the entire set of max
bids that were submitted, the results showed that the four auction formats were
significantly different [F (3, 932) = 2.704, p = 0.044]. Follow-up Fisher's PLSD test
revealed that the differences were mostly contributed by the significantly differences
between eBay and eBay p<1 [p = 0.0139] and between eBay p<1 and Sealed-bid [p = 0.0192]
at the 0.05 level.
2 "Max bid" is defined as the largest bid amount ever submitted by a bidder in an auction, valid
or invalid.
3 
"Final bid" is defined as the valid bid amount a bidder submitted in the final bidding round. It
can be from a "raise bid" action or a "keep bid" action.
4 "Winning bid" is defined as the final result of an auction, which equals to the amount that the
winner/highest bidder has to pay, on a second-price basis.
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Final Bid
"Final bids" can be considered as valid max bids. In fact, the data pattern we
obtained for final bid is very similar to that of max bid. In descriptive statistics, final bids
in Sealed-bid and eBay were higher than those in Amazon and eBay p<1. Sealed-bid on
average received higher final bids than the other auction formats.
The overall ANOVA test on the 4 auction formats on the entire set of final bids
showed that the four auction formats were significantly different [F (3, 932) = 3.490, p =
0.015]. Follow-up Fisher's PLSD test revealed that the differences were mostly
contributed by the significantly differences between eBay and eBay p<1 [p = 0.0047] and
between eBay p<1 and Sealed-bid [p = 0.0068] at the 0.05 level.
Winning Bid
Unlike max bid or final bid, winning bid is the actual result of an auction and the
amount that the winner needs to pay. In a second-price auction, winning bid is
determined by the second-highest bid. The winning bid was recorded on a per auction
basis. The descriptive statistics on winning bid showed that eBay received the highest
average winning bid (mean = 4.761) followed by Sealed-bid, Amazon, eBay p<1, in the order
listed.
When analyzing the winning bid in an overall ANOVA test, the four auction
formats were significantly different [F (3, 932) = 8.668, p < 0.0001]. Follow-up Fisher's
PLSD test revealed that the differences of most pairs, except the pair of Amazon vs.
Sealed-bid and eBay vs. Sealed bid, were significantly different at the level of 0.05.
Figure 7 presents the descriptive statistics for max bid, final bid, and winning bid.
Max bid andfinal bid have almost the same results across different auction formats except
for the format of eBay p<1 where some bids in final rounds were lost. In all 3 situations
Sealed-bid has shown higher averages than Amazon and eBay p<1, but very close results to
eBay. However, if we take the average of Amazon, eBay and eBay p<1, as a representation
of English auction; then we see that all three measures (max bid, final bid, winning bid) in
Sealed-bid were higher on average than those submitted in English auctions.
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The mechanism of English format, as we have introduced, encourages learning
among fellow bidders. It was expected that through bidding, bidders are able to obtain
additional information on the goods they bid on, hence thefinal bid would be lower than
that of Sealed-bid. However, it is not clear from the three measures (max bid, final bid,
winning bid) why eBay resulted in close or even higher averages than Sealed-bid. Further
more, given the statistics shown above in max bid,final bid, and winning bid, it is also not
clear whether the "final period" operation has any influence in bidders' behavior. To
have a close look at this effect, we constructed another two measures "max bid -first bid"
and "final bid - second final bid", as dependent measures of the three English auction
formats we tested. "Max bid - first bid" is defined as the difference between the bid
amount a bidder entered in the first bidding round and the bid amount entered in the
final bidding round, which will measure the extent that bidders initially announce their
true valuations for the goods. The measure "final bid - second final bid" is defined as the
bid amount difference between the last two bidding rounds. The higher this measure is,
the more likely bidders shaded their bid until the last minute, and the stronger the "final
period" effect is.
Max bid - first bid
Descriptive statistics showed that among the three types of English auctions,
eBay has the strongest effect (mean = 1.516) followed by Amazon (mean = 1.100) and eBay
p<1 (mean = 0.957). In the overall ANOVA test, these three types of English auction
formats were significantly different [F (3, 932) = 18.545, p < 0.0001]. Follow-up Fisher's
PLSD test revealed that the differences of all pairs but between Amazon vs. eBay p<1
were significantly different at the level of 0.05.
Final bid - second final bid
eBay had the highest mean [mean = .989, p < .0001] among the three English
auction formats followed by eBay p<1 [mean = .254, p<.0001]] and Amazon [mean = .012,
p = .0327]. All but Amazon have shown strong "final period" effect that bids jumped
suddenly in the final rounds. Followed up by an Unpaired t-test for three auction
formats, the differences of all pairs were significantly different.
45
If bidders knew how much an item was worthy of, why wouldn't they just place
the maximal bids in the first round but bothered to raise the bids gradually or wait to
the last minute? In either case the bidder would never overpay for the item since it was
a second-price auction. Shading individual valuations are not unusual in English
auctions, as it has become a common strategy. It can be explained as a learning process
as well as the psychology of second-guessing what other bidders are thinking, which is
an especially serious problem in English auctions. The "final period" effect is less
significant in Amazon auction format but very significant in eBay and eBay p<1 formats.
In Amazon format, an auction will not finish until nobody raises bids for two consecutive
rounds or it will keep going forever, thus bidders will have to disclose their valuations
for the goods sooner or later and other bidders will always have chances to challenge the
highest bid. While there is always a final chance in either of the eBay auction formats,
bidders tend to wait until the final round to disclose their true valuations.
In fact, when the multi-round bidding process in eBay auctions (p =1 and p<1)
involves more competition than learning, an eBay format auction will eventually
converge to a Sealed-bid auction that bidders will only submit true valuations in the final
period. This might explain why eBay (p=l) auctions has shown very close values as
Sealed-bid in all three measures in Figure 7.
Looking at the data we collected in this experiment, we can conclude that
different auction formats do have different impacts on bidders' behavior, especially the
"final period effect". However, we were not able to conclude much on the competition
effect. What we can say is only that any knowledge of other bidders' behavior would
influence a given bidder's valuation of the item to be sold, as well as the extent to which
he/she shades, because the auction format itself may convey information about bidders'
valuations. Competition effect, in this experiment, was not considered exclusively
hence no judgement can be reached. In the Appendix of this paper, a better experiment
design is recommended to examine the competition effect. Due to time limitation, the
experiment could not be conducted before this paper was finished.
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Chavter 6 Conclusions and Future Research
Now we return from presenting experimental results to summarizing
discussions of them with the purpose of drawing general conclusions and implications.
The main focus of this paper has been to document the behavioral phenomenon
and to examine some of the potential factors that are responsible for the bidding
behavior in Internet auctioning. Both subjective and empirical data have shown
evidence that some psychological and behavioral factors are involved in bidding. Here
is the summary of the major findings.
First, a noticeable number of subjects admitted that their attitudes towards
auctioning were similar to game playing. It is very interesting to see that people treat
auctions differently from traditional shopping and that personal emotions, in addition to
money, were heavily involved. One may ask how long this tendency will last and
whether it is a function of the novelty of Internet auctions or whether this attitude will
sustain over time. The proliferation of casinos on one hand and the fact that many of
our respondents were very experienced in Internet auctions on the other indicate this
might be more than initial enthusiasm.
Second, in a noticeable number of times bidders either suffered "winner's curse"
or they regretted losing in auctions. This has implied strong winning aspects in bidding
attitude. While some bidders could win only when they overpaid in auctions, others
regretted for losing even though they actually didn't lose anything in terms of money.
Third, even though bidders said they compared prices elsewhere before they bid
on auctions, they actually were not well informed and often ended up with higher
prices. Considering the logic behind this, it is very interesting to see what people said
were different from what they did.
Fourth, bidders were affected by the initial price information suggested by
sellers. Prices suggested by the sellers seemed to have more influence on bidders than
the widely available information of market prices. This again implied that many
bidders were poorly informed.
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Fifth, evidence has shown that bidders were influenced by the way auctions
were conducted (auction formats) and the behavior of their fellow bidders. However, it
is still too early to make judgment on the effect of competition.
The substantial data collected from real auctions presented supportive results to
our expectation that irrational determinants do exist in auctions. These results alone can
draw the conclusion that auctions, specifically Internet auctions, are far from an efficient
form of trading mechanisms, despite the fact that Internet auctions are often proclaimed
as the ideal way to match buyers and sellers. Internet auctions, like any other auctions,
are prone to two fundamental flaws: winner's curse and collusion. The former usually
hurts bidders in that the winners are the only ones who overpay. Collusion, which
usually hurts sellers, is especially easy when there are few buyers or sellers, as in many
business-to-business transactions. While psychological and behavioral factors are related
to personal preferences and individual values, it is still possible to minimize their effect
through educating bidders and designing clever mechanisms. Educating means
enabling bidders to process all available information about the goods for sale hence
more accurately maximize their expected utility and estimate their individual
fundamental values. Through a better design of auction mechanisms with improved
transparency not only in terms of auction rules but also information during bidding,
some collusion can be possibly reduced.
As Internet auctioning has become a widely accepted trading channel for
consumers and businesses, it has also become very important to understand the
mechanism and the human decision-making process involved. In the future, researches
are to be focused on the examination of the competition issue and further analysis in
auction formats. In laboratory experiments, a more precise bidding system is needed
for better simulation of real auctions.
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Avpendix 1
Items auctioned in laboratory experiment
Item Name Description Purchase Price W
MIT Baseball Standard baseball with "MIT" on it
Beverage Opener Key Ring Round Key ring functions as opener 5.98
MIT Leather Folder (Black) Genuine leather pad holder with black accents 29.98
embossed with MIT and seal.
MIT Logo Mug (Black) 11 oz. black ceramic mug with M.I.T and seal 12.95
design
MIT Logo Glass Shooter Glass shooter, 6 cm in height with MIT seal on it 5.98
MIT Logo Metal Key Ring (Red) Rectangular King ring with MIT logo on it 6.98
MIT Metal Logo Mug (Burgundy) Octagon shape 11 ozmug with metal MIT seal 12.981
MIT Logo Silver-tone Bookmark Metal bookmark with MIT seal on it 9.98
MIT Cap (Stone and Light Olive) Cotton cap with "MIT" at the front 18.98
MIT Frisbee Plastic Frisbee with "big dome" printed on it 0
MIT Logo Metal Key Ring (White) Rectangular King ring with MIT logo on it 5.98
MIT Hockey Hockey Puck and net with "MIT" on the puck 9.98
MIT Leather Metal Logo Folder Genuine leather pad holder in Burgundy with 21.98
(Burgundy) metal MIT seal.
MIT Cotton T-Shirt (Navy) Cotton Crew T-shirt with MIT on the front 16.98
MIT Logo Mug 11 oz. maroon ceramic mug with M.I.T and seal 6.98
design
Godiva Chocolate Truffle Assortment 4 - p.c. Set, 1 box 6.50
MIT Antique-finished Round Key Dimensional brass key tag with MIT seal 6.98
Ring
Boston Screen Saver Screen Saver CD with lots of pictures of Boston 14.99
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Appendix 2
A Proposed Experiment Design for Examination of Competition in auctions
This experiment was designed to examine in a more thorough way the possible
effect caused by competition in auctions. By competition, we mean the phenomenon in
auctions bidders raise bids as prices go up. It is expected that if more "raising bids"
actions take place, the final results of an auction will be higher.
Method
Subjects: Subjects are to be recruited from Massachusetts Institute of
Technology. No auctioning experience is required. There will be only one subject
participating in the experiment at a time. Each subject will spent from 15 minutes to 40
minutes depends on the experimental conditions and subject's performance (more on
this later). Besides recruiting subjects from real people, 8 different fake personalities
will be created by computer and participate in every auction with the human subjects.
The actions by fake personalities are programmed by the computer and will be executed
automatically. However, human subjects will not be informed that they are to compete
with virtual person but similar subjects from other web sites.
Experimental Conditions: There are three types of conditions corresponding to
three types of competitions. Auction format will be fixed to the eBay format we have
discussed before.
For all auction formats in the laboratory, time is discrete instead of continuous.
Each auction will be sliced into multiple rounds of bidding. In each round, members of
a given group will need to make bidding decision on an item. There are two types of
decisions that subjects can make: they can either raise their bids or keep the bids they
entered in the previous round (for the first round, all subjects have to raise their bids).
Only when all participants (including fake personalities) in the same auction have made
decisions can the auction move to a next bidding round. The three types of competition
status are described as:
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* No Competition In this status, all fake personalities are programmed to
submitted their bids in a natural way that the bids will go up linearly and converge
to a constant. This is the simulation of natural bidding.
* Early Competition In this status, all fake personalities are programmed to
raise their bids to 75% of the market retail price within the first 2 bidding rounds.
Starting from the third round, the bid-raising of fake personalities are programmed
to slow down and naturally converge to a constant.
* Late Competition In this status, all fake personalities are programmed to
submit very low bids naturally for the first 2 bidding rounds. Starting from the third
round, bidding will be speed up with a result of reaching 75% of the market retail
price by the end of the fourth round. After the fourth round, bid-raising speed will
be slowed down again and naturally converge to a constant.
Design: The main experimental manipulation is the competition status, which
will be manipulated between subjects in 3 status: No competition, early competition, and
late competition. All subjects will be given both a written and an oral instruction on
general bidding. Each subject is provided with a printed catalog with 18 color pictures
of 18 different goods each plus brief description. Most items are MIT memorabilia and
the retail prices range from $5.00 to $30.00. In addition to the general bidding rules,
subjects were informed of the following information before started:
" All 18 items are auctioned for real which means there will be exchange of money and
goods at the end of the experiment
e For every given group, even though all 18 items will be auctioned, only 1 out of 18 is
available for sale. The available item will be announced only after the experiment is
over. We applied this policy to reduce some possible noises in the experiment such
as preference bidding (i.e. subjects only bid on things they are interested in) and the
worry of one's pocket. All subjects are asked to evaluate each item as if it is the only
item that they will be able to get.
* At the end of experiment, the available item will be randomly generated by
computer and if the winner is subject, he/she will pay for the item.
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After reviewing an item on the catalog, subject will estimate the valuation of the
item and enter an initial number. Starting from the second bidding round (sealed-bid
excluded), subject can raise bid by entering a bigger number greater than the current
highest bid, or he/she can simply press the "keep bid" button to stay with the original
bids they submitted. When subject finishes bidding on one item, he/she will move to
the next item listed on catalog and starting bidding again. Catalogs are prepared in
different versions with different listing order of 18 items to counterbalance. Also, the
competition status assigned to each item will be randomly to avoid awareness from
subject. For each listing order, 7 subjects will be tested and the experiment will run over
all listing orders before it starts a new cycle.
Procedures: Before the experiment starts, bidding instructions will be explained.
Subject will be told that he/she will face real decisions for real money in which he/she
will be asked to indicate the amount he/she would like to pay for 18 different items
listed in the catalog.
Subject is assigned to a computer from which Internet is accessed. The bidding
system is built on one of the server at MIT and can be accessed by any browser. Subject
then will log in to the bidding system using a pre-assigned user name. The first web
page shows the auction for the first item listed in the catalog. The bidding interface is
vertically divided into 2 parts. The left part shows the public information that all
participants (including fake personalities) in the group are able to access at the same
time. It contains the name of the item currently offered, type of auction format used, the
numbering of the current bidding round, highest bidder's user name, current winning
bid, and the total number of bidders participated. Also at the lower part of the public
information board, a bidding history of last round's results is presented with the
winning bidder's name on the top and the lowest bidder's username in the bottom. The
right part of the screen shows the private information that only the user who logged in
the machine can access. It includes the username and the number that user entered last
time. On the lower part of the private information board is the box that allows bidder to
enter a higher bid. If subject wants to raise his/her bid, he/she has to press the "raise
bid" button after entering a higher bid; or if subject wants to stay with the current bid,
he/she can just do by pressing the "keep bid" button. For the first round, subject can
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only raise his/her bid, no matter how much he or she raises to. Starting from the second
round, subject can choose from "raise bid" or "keep bid". However, in any round
except the first one, subject has to enter a number that is greater than the bigger one of
the current highest bid and his/her last bid. That is, bids can not be lowed. The system
will automatically move to a new round when all participants have finished the current
round. During the bidding, subject is able to look up the public information board on
the left part of the screen for the current highest bid.
After the final round of an auction, subject can click on the screen and view the
results including all final bids of all participants. Then, he/she will move to the auction
of the next item in the catalog. The amount of time spent on each experiment really
depended on the individual performance.
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